CORPORATIONS EVENLY DIVIDED: JUDICIAL
REMEDIES FOR EQUAL SHAREHOLDERS
Stuart L. Pachman*
Controversies between and among shareholders in closely
held corporations are currently decided in New Jersey under section 14A:12-7 of the New Jersey Statutes.' These disputes generally
fall into two categories: minority oppression cases, in which a majority is able to flex its corporate muscle allegedly to the detriment
of the minority,2 and deadlock situations, in which two factions or
two shareholders are evenly divided and oppose each other. In
both types of cases, for reasons running the gamut from differences over business policy to incompatible personalities, the shareholder "family" is unable to live in the same corporate "house."
I.

DEADLOCK AND MINORrY OPPRESSION DISTINGUISHED

New Jersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7 deals reasonably well with cases of minority oppression where there is a clear
majority and a distinct minority. These cases often involve one or
both of the following fact patterns: (1) a minority shareholder be* BA, University of Virginia; LL.B (cum laude), Harvard Law School; Principal,
Clapp & Eisenberg, Newark, New Jersey. Mr. Pachman is the author of PACHMAN,
TrrLE 14A CORPORATIONS (1993), and co-author of PACHMAN & CONOVER, NEW JERSEY
CoRPoRATE FoRMs (Butterworth Legal Publishers). He was also the Section Chair of
the Corporate and Business Law Section of the NewJersey State Bar Association from
1986-1988 and has been a Director of that Section since 1979.
1 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14.12-7 (West Supp. 1992). This statute, substantially in its
present form, was enacted as L.1973, c.366, § 67. It became part of NewJersey corporate law as a result of the Final Report of the Corporation Law Revision Commission
(1972), which included a proposal to amend N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A.12-7, part of The
NewJersey Business Corporation Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A.1-1 et seq. (1969), to incorporate the concept of minority oppression. The amendment became effective May 1,
1974. Prior thereto, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 was substantially similar to N.J. REv.
STAT. § 14:13-15 (1938) which dealt essentially with deadlock. Deadlock is the inability of a corporation to function because of an equal division of directors and an equal
division of voting shares. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A.12-7 was again amended by L.1988,
c.94, effective December 1, 1988, which effected two changes more fully described
infra at note 6. There are, of course, controversies between and among shareholders
in which N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 is not involved. See Gershaw v. Ther-A-Pedic
Sleep Prods. Inc., 218 N.J. Super. 350 (App. Div. 1987). Similar, although not identical, statutes exist in other jurisdictions.
2 "Minority shareholder" is defined flexibly. One may own more than 50% of the
corporation but nonetheless be a minority shareholder for purposes of N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:12-7(1) (c) if the shareholder does not have voting control. See Berger v.
Berger, 249 N.J. Super. 305, 592 A.2d 321 (Ch. Div. 1991).
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lieves he or she is being treated unfairly or "unequally" and has
become a corporate pariah; (2) the majority perceives a minority
shareholder as not pulling his or her weight or the majority senses
that it has "outgrown" the minority and thus no longer sees the
need to continue to share the profits of the business with the minority. In either situation, when the minority seeks relief under
New Jersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7, the majority will
likely move to buy out the minority pursuant to NewJersey Statutes
Annotated section 14A:12-7(8).' If the motion is granted, the
court determines the fair value of the minority's shares and, depending upon one's point of view, the corporate wound is either
healed or excised. When the majority is running the corporation,
and the minority "wants out" with the value of its investment, the
mechanisms offered by the statute can generally accommodate the
parties.4
Where there is deadlock, 5 however, and each of two equal
shareholders or factions wish to be the buyer 6 and neither wishes
to be the seller, the statute does not offer a ready solution. Consider the following hypothetical.
Ilene Inventor has an idea for a new product, but doesn't have
the expertise to get it to market. Mark Marketeer, recently the vic3 Whether because of economics (the minority must necessarily come up with
more consideration than the majority to buy out the shares of the other), political
realities of the situation within the corporation, pressure asserted by the court, or the
realization by counsel or the litigants that the parties must be "divorced" in one way
or another, minority oppression cases are often resolved by a buy-out. See Harry J.
Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary DissolutionSuits as a Remedy For Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CL-v. ST. L. REv. 25, 53 (1987). For additional supporting statistics,
see JAC.Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed
Statutoy Solution to the Remaining Close CorporationProblem, 63 VA. L. REv. 1, 33 (1977).
4 Haynsworth, supra note 3, at 53; Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 3, at 33.
5 One of the definitions of deadlock is a state of inaction or neutralization caused
by the opposition of persons or factions. Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1323
1978)). The court in
(D.S.C. 1987) (citing Callier v. Callier, 378 N.E.2d 405, 408 (Ill.
Hend/ey acknowledged that there was little testimony concerning the inability of the
corporation to function, but recognized this is what would probably have occurred
had the court not intervened. Id. It was clear that the mutual dislike of the parties
had divided the management of the corporation. Id.
6 Prior to L.1988, c.94, which amended N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7, effective December 1, 1988, only the plaintiff could be forced to sell his or her shares. Gershaw v.
Ther-A-Pedic Sleep Prods. Inc., 218 N.J. Super 350, 356, 527 A.2d 923, 926 (App. Div.
1987). The amendment now permits any party to the action to move to buy out any
other party. Bostock v. High Tech Elevator Indus., Inc., 260 N.J. Super. 432, 445, 616
A.2d 1314, 1321 (App. Div. 1992). The other change to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7
effected by L.1988, c.94 is that whereas formerly the buy-out had to be in cash, now
the court may determine the method of payment of the purchase price. The statute
states that a cash price is preferable and terms should be determined only if an all
cash payment is "not practicable." N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:12-7(8)(e).
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tim of downsizing at a major corporation, steps into the picture.
Ilene's idea and production knowledge and Mark's business experience and marketing skills seem a perfect match. A lawyer fills in
some blanks in a form certificate of incorporation, names Ilene
and Mark as the corporation's two directors, and files the certificate with the Secretary of State thereby creating Ilemark, Inc. The
lawyer draws two stock certificates, one for Ilene and one for Mark,
each for 100 shares. The lawyer neglects to provide Ilemark, Inc.,
with by-laws, does not suggest the need for a shareholders' agreement, and fails to discuss the potential pitfalls of corporate
marriage. 7
Eighteen months later, Ilene is producing, Mark is selling,
Ilemark, Inc., is beginning to be profitable, and Ilene and Mark
cannot stand each other. Ilene does not think Mark is doing
enough to increase sales; Mark does not think Ilene is doing
enough to improve the product. Each suspects everything the
other does, and neither respects anything the other does. Each
acts as he or she thinks best for the corporation, and each disagrees with what the other is doing.
The controversy might be resolved amicably by a division of
the business, a buy-out by one shareholder (or the corporation) of
the other, or if the two shareholders were able to agree to an independent board of directors. If the parties cannot come to an
amicable resolution, the unhappy shareholder may elect to
subordinate his or her views and desires to the acts and practices of
the other. The unhappy shareholder could also walk out, leaving
the daily activity of the business but continuing to own the shares
as an asset over which he or she has no practical control and as to
which there will be no current return. If these choices are unpalatable, the unhappy shareholder must press for the ultimate remedy:
dissolution.'
7 "Where the stock of a corporation is divided into two equal parts, human nature
being what it is, it is necessary and advisable for the parties to anticipate the possibility
of a deadlock." In re Evening Journal Ass'n, 7 N.J. Super. 360, 375, 71 A.2d 158, 167
(Ch. Div. 1950). In that case the two equal shareholders had adopted by-laws peculiarly adapted to their circumstances and designed to facilitate the corporation's business conduct in the event of disagreement. Id.
8 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's CLOSE CORPORATIONS
§ 9.03, at 10 (3d ed. 1988).
Although dissolution is the ultimate remedy expressly provided by the statute,
the appellate division recently instructed:
[W] hen a cause of action has been established under the Oppressed Minority Shareholder Statute, and when the remedies provided for in that
statute fail to afford the injured party with adequate relief, a court of
equity undoubtedly has the authority and flexibility to fashion a remedy,
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Ilene and Mark have reached stalemate. In corporate law
terms they are deadlocked. 9 Each consults counsel, not to get out
of the corporation, but to get the other out. Counsel will look to
NewJersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7(1) (b) as an avenue
through which to seek relief.'
New Jersey Statutes Annotated section 14A.12-7 authorizes a
court to grant four express forms of relief: (i) appointment of a
provisional director, (ii) appointment of a custodian, (iii) an order
directing a buy-out on the motion of a party, and (iv) dissolution of
the corporation. 1 ' The first two forms of relief are merely interim
measures. A provisional director or a custodian may help guide
which may include monetary damages, in order to ameliorate the wrong.
This result obtains not from the express terms of the statute, but from
the long established principle that equity will not suffer a wrong without
a remedy.
Walensky v. Jonathan Royce Int'l., 264 NJ. Super. 276, 279, 824 A.2d 613, 615 (App.
Div. 1993) (emphasis added); see also Brenner v. Berkowitz, 261 N.J. Super. 63, 617
A.2d 1225 (App. Div. 1992), certif granted, 133 N.J. 435, 627 A.2d 1141 (1993). Note
the underscored words "injured party" and "wrong." In Walensky, "a legal right was
clearly infringed" and plaintiffs demonstrated "oppressive" conduct by defendants.
Walenshy, 264 NJ. Super. at 282, 624 A.2d at 617. In the hypothetical there is neither
an injured party nor a wrong; the two shareholders are simply incompatible business
partners.
9 Stalemate or deadlock is also possible in corporations that have adopted high or
unanimous vote requirements. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:5-12(1), 14A.6-7.1(4). See
Haynsworth, supra note 3, at 34-35 (1987).
10 Eventually the requirements of NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1) (a) will also probably be met. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A-12-7(1) (c) probably does not apply. By hypotheses,
neither of the two shareholders has acted fraudulently or illegally, nor mismanaged
the corporation, nor abused his or her authority, even though each may think the
other is acting oppressively or unfairly. In Bostock v. High Tech Elevator Indus., 260
N.J. Super. 432, 616 A.2d 1314 (App. Div. 1992), the trial court had found that
neither of the two 55%-45% shareholders had acted in an oppressive fashion toward
the other. Id. at 438, 616 A.2d at 1317. The appellate division denied relief under
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A.12-7, but affirmed relief under the terms of a shareholder's
agreement. Id. at 446, 616 A.2d at 1322.
11 A court is not necessarily limited to the four remedies expressly authorized by
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A.12-7. Brennerv. Berkowitz instructs that equity has no limit on its
"flexibility in devising a variety of remedies and shaping them to fit the circumstances
of a particular case." Brenner,261 N.J. Super. at 80, 617 A.2d at 1233; see Walensky, 264
N.J. Super. at 279, 624 A.2d at 615. Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc. suggests a
number of possible additional remedies; including an injunction against wrongful
conduct, an order for a declaration of a dividend, or an award of damages. Baker v.
Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387 (Or. 1973). The court in In re Rappaportalso suggested reducing excess salaries of those in control. In re Rappaport, 487
N.Y.S.2d 376 (App. Div. 1985). These solutions may be feasible in minority oppression cases, and in deadlock cases where one shareholder operates the business and
the other does not. Where control of the operation of the business is at issue, they
will probably miss the mark. See Note, Deadlock in a Close Cmporation:A Suggestion for
Protectinga Dissident, Co-Equal Shareholder, 1972 DuKx L.J. 653, 660 (1972) [hereinafter
DuKE Note].
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the corporate ship while the litigation is pending, but if the mutual
dislike between the shareholders is so pervasive, the relationship is
probably irreparably damaged. 12 Divorce through a buy-out of one
shareholder by the other, a sale of the whole business by both
shareholders to a third party, or dissolution of the enterprise is
inevitable.
II.

THE

DEADLOCK DILEMMA

An analysis of the cases deciding disputes between two equal
shareholders requires some historical perspective, first at common
law, then under the early, strictly construed, deadlock statutes,'and finally under the broader authority of statutes such as New
Jersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7. 4
At common law there was some doubt whether a court of equity, absent statutory authority, had inherent power to dissolve a
deadlocked corporation which, despite the deadlock, was solvent
12 The function of a provisional director is to act as a mediator or conciliator, cast
a deciding vote on the director level, and use his or her persuasiveness in pressing
new ideas or alternatives. One treatise suggests that if "the participants' views on policy are basically incompatible and are firmly held, the appointment of a provisional
director may only be a temporary measure that postpones more drastic remedies." F.
HODGE O'N.AL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's OPPRESSION OF MINORrY SHAREHOLDERS, § 7.23, at 125 (2d ed. 1991). A dispute that is serious enough to necessitate
the appointment of a provisional director will likely result in a buy-out or dissolution.
Harold D. Field, Resolving ShareholderDisputes and BreakingDeadlocks in the Close Corporation, 58 MINN. L. REv. 985, 1005 (1974).
It is important to remember that "[c]onscientious disagreements with respect to
corporate business management and policy are more or less inevitable and ordinarily
reconcilable." RKO Theatres v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 9 N.J. Super.
401, 403, 74 A.2d 914, 915 (Ch. Div. 1950). If the disagreements between two shareholders are purely on matters of business judgment with each respecting, while disagreeing with, the other's point of view, a provisional director may solve the problem.
In that case, however, the parties will likely have the good sense to agree upon a third
person to help them "call the shots" without the intervention of lawyers or the court.
The third party should be someone not only capable of mediating the shareholders'
differences, but also a person with sufficient knowledge of the industry to be able to
make sound management policy decisions. Field, supra, at 999.
1S

See, e.g., N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 14:13-15 (West 1938).

There are minority oppression and deadlock statutes in most states. See 3 MODEL
BusINEss CORPORATION AcT ANNOTATED, § 14.30, at 1535 (1993 Supp.). Caution must
be exercised, however, in comparing cases under statutes in different jurisdictions
because the language of the statutes is not uniform. See Post-Standard Co. v. Evening
Journal Ass'n, 15 N.J. Super. 58, 68, 83 A.2d 38, 43 (Ch. Div. 1951) (citation omitted)
(rejecting a New York decision because of the particular language of the New York
statute). Despite the fact that Delaware does not have a minority oppression statute,
§ 273 of Delaware General Corporation Law specifically deals with certain corporate
disputes between 50-50 shareholders. See In reVenture Advisors, Inc., 14 DEL.J. CORP.
L. 1192 (Del. Ch. 1989) (not officially reported).
14
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or functioning. 5 Not all jurisdictions limited equity's inherent
power, particularly where it was shown that one, or a group, of the
shareholders had engaged in wrongdoing.' 6 Some courts strove to
find a rationale under which they could act. For example, the
Michigan Supreme Court' acknowledged the then-prevailing rule
that absent a statute, equity was powerless to dissolve a corporation,
but found an exception where substantial dissension rendered it
impossible for the corporation to carry out the purposes for which
it had been formed. 8
The New Jersey Legislature in 1938 offered some relief to the
limitations of the common law by enacting NewJersey Revised Statutes section 14:13-15 to deal with certain deadlock situations. If,
however, the facts of a given case did not squarely meet the statutory requirements, relief could not be granted.' 9
By the time New Jersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7
was amended in 1974 to provide expressly, in subsection 9, that
where the statutory prerequisites were met, a court had the authority to dissolve a corporation even though profitable, case law in
NewJersey had already recognized that equity, independent of statutory authority, could allow for the appointment of a receiver and
the dissolution of a corporation. 20 In In re Collins-Doan Co., 21 the

15 SeeDorfv. Hill Bus Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 444, 54 A.2d 761 (1947); Sternberg v. Wolff,
56 N.J. Eq. 389, 29 A. 397 (1898).
16 See Saltz v. Saltz Bros., 84 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Nashville Packet Co. v.
Neville, 235 S.W. 64 (Tenn. 1921) (where one 50% shareholder physically attacked
the other, the court appointed a receiver and wound up the corporation); Burleson v.
Hayutin, 273 P.2d 124 (Colo. 1954) (where one 50% shareholder assumed control of
the corporation for his benefit and excluded the other, the court found plaintiff's
.ouster" to be a wrong to be remedied by the appointment of a receiver). Cf Gidwitz
v. Lanzit Corrugated Box C., 170 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1960) (conduct similar to that in
Burleson was treated as oppression of the excluded 50% family).
17 Flemming v. Heffner & Flemming, 248 N.W. 900 (Mich. 1933).
18 Id. In Levant v. Kowal the court suggested that perhaps insolvency had to be
shown in minority shareholder oppression cases before the court could dissolve the
corporation. Levant v. Kowal, 86 N.W.2d 236 (Mich. 1957). In a 50-50 deadlock case,
however, the court had inherent power to dissolve even in the absence of insolvency.
Id. at 343 (citing In re Collins-Doan Co., 3 NJ. 382 (1949)).
19 Dorfv. Hill Bus Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 444, 54 A.2d 761 (1947). See also Costabile v.
Essex Linoleum and Carpet Co., 98 NJ. Super. 224, 236 A.2d 625 (Ch. Div. 1967). In
Dorf,the court denied relief where one 50% shareholder operated the corporation as
his own to the exclusion of the other 50% shareholder because there was not an even
number of directors. Dorf,140 N.J. Eq. at 447-48, 54 A.2d at 763. Hence, the facts did
not fit within the terms of the statute. Id. Common law, as it then existed in New
Jersey, did not authorize the court to dissolve a profitable corporation independent of
statute. Id. at 448, 54 A.2d at 763.
20 See Bostock v. High Tech Elevator Indus., 260 N.J. Super. 432, 443, 616 A.2d
1314, 1320 (App. Div. 1992), and cases cited therein.
21 3 N.J. 382 (1949).
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Supreme Court of NewJersey acknowledged that irreconcilable differences between two independent classes or groups of shareholders with equal voting power had to be recognized.2 2
Prior to 1974, even with the common law's liberalization of a
court's authority to dissolve corporations racked by dissension,
courts were faced with a choice between dismissing the action or
directing dissolution of a viable corporation. 2' The courts' frustration may be sensed from a case in which a defendant refused plaintiff's offer to buy or sell for a set price, and the court could do no
more than allow the parties fifteen days to effect a "harmonious
solution" before entering an order of dissolution. 24 Forced buyout, as we shall see, was later authorized by statute 2 - and, in some
jurisdictions, found to be an inherent equitable remedy. 6
To understand the judicial preference for buy-out and the reasons why dissolution is viewed as an unsatisfactory remedy, the
mechanisms of dissolution and its consequences must be understood. Dissolution generally means the appointment of a receiver
to wind up the business, sell its assets, pay its debts, and, if anything
is left, distribute the balance ratably to the shareholders. 7 It is the
22 Id. at 391-92, 70 A.2d at 164. See alsoJusticeJacobs's pithy statement in Stark v.
Reingold: "[R]elations between the Starks and the Reingolds have been too seriously
breached to suggest future agreement and decent corporate operation." Stark, 18 N.J.
251, 266 (1955).
23 Whether, absent statutory authority, a court has inherent power to order one
shareholder or the corporation to buy out another shareholder has not been directly
answered in New Jersey. See infra text at notes 77-81. Cases in other jurisdictions
indicate that courts do have inherent equitable authority to order a buy-out. See infra
note 81. This appears to be a relatively recent development. Id. In the New Jersey
decisions prior to the enactment of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(8) in 1974, there appears to be no discussion of equity's inherent power to order a buy-out as a remedy in
shareholder dispute cases. Courts either granted dissolution when the case met the
requirements of the statute, In re Collins-Doan Co., 3 N.J. 382, 70 A.2d 159 (1949);
Post-Standard Co. v. Evening Journal Ass'n, 15 N.J. Super. 58, 83 A.2d 38 (Ch. Div.
1951); RKO Theatres v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 9 N.J. Super. 401, 74
A.2d 914 (Ch. Div. 1950), or denied relief when the statutory requirements were not
met, Dorf v. Hill Bus Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 444, 54 A.2d 763 (1947). See also Costabile v.
Essex Linoleum and Carpet Co., 98 N.J. Super. 224, 236 A.2d 635 (Ch. Div. 1967).
24 RKO Theatres v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 9 N.J. Super. 491, 410
(Ch. Div. 1950).
25 See infra text at note 34.
26 See infra text at note 81.
27 See 68th St. Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 362 A.2d 78 (Law Div.
1976), aftd, 150 N.J. Super. 47, 374 A.2d 1222 (App. Div. 1977). A corporate dissolution involves a liquidation of assets and winding up of the business. Hendley v. Lee,
676 F. Supp. 1317, 1319, 374 A.2d 1222 (D.S.C. 1987). In In re Surchin, the court
appointed the lawyers for the parties as co-receivers to determine how long the business would continue, what employees would be engaged and other questions dealing
with the preservation of the property and carrying on of the business. In re Surchin,
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"ultimate remedy,"28 fraught with unsatisfactory consequences.

Dissolution's likely result is that none of the shareholders will realize the full value of his or her investment.2

The consequences

may spill over to others, such as the corporation's employees.
There is also an inherent unfairness to dissolution if one of
two
shareholders can recommence the business alone in anthe
other form, while the other shareholder is unable to do so. This is

possible, for example, where in a sales or 30service business, one
shareholder has all of the customer contact.
It is not surprising that dissolution is viewed with disfavor by
courts and will be ordered only as a last resort. In Petition of Levitt,s1 the court posited that a buy-out is "far preferable to the poten32
tial destructive impact attending dissolution of the corporation."
Even after the case has been tried, the court may stay its order to
permit a buy-out motion to be made.3 3
III.

THE BuY-OuT REMEDY

A court ordered buy-out, as an alternative to dissolution in
286 N.Y.S.2d 580, 586 (Sup. Ct. 1967). The receivers were also charged with the responsibility of presenting to the court a plan for orderly dissolution and disposition of
the property including its name and goodwill. Id.
In In re T.J. Ronan Paint Corp., the court directed approval of a plan of dissolution
to the extent it directed a public sale of the corporation unless the parties were able
to agree to all of the terms of a private sale. In reT.J. Ronan Paint Corp., 469 N.Y.S.2d
931 (App. Div. 1983).
28 Gershaw v. Ther-A-Pedic Sleep Prods., 218 NJ. Super. 350, 355, 527 A.2d 923,
925 (App. Div. 1987).
29 DuKE Note, supra note 11, at 659-60. The writer stated that:
Winding-up a close corporation is a drastic remedy which will deny the
shareholder-officers the opportunity to participate in an enterprise
which has likely provided participants with their primary source of income. Depending on local economic conditions, a court-appointed receiver may be unable to find a buyer willing to purchase the enterprise
as a going concern at a reasonable price. Failure to find such a buyer
will necessitate the piecemeal selling of the corporation's assets, a disposition which ordinarily results in the realization of an amount substantially less than if the business were sold as a going concern.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
30 Cf.In re Cantelmo, 88 N.Y.S.2d 604 (App. Div. 1949).
31 492 N.Y.S.2d 736 (App. Div. 1985).
32 Id. at 740.
33 See Brenner v. Berkowitz, 261 N.J. Super. 63, 617 A.2d 1225 (App. Div. 1992),
certif granted, 133 N.J. 435, 627 A.2d 1141 (1993); Hughes v. Sego Int'l. Ltd., 192 N.J.
Super. 60, 469 A.2d 74 (App. Div. 1983). See also Levant v. Kowal, 86 N.W.2d 336
(Mich. 1957). In In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., the court said that every order of dissolution must be conditioned on permitting any shareholder to elect to purchase the
complaining shareholder's stock at fair value. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 484
N.Y.S.2d 799 (1984).
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shareholder dispute cases, appears to have first been authorized by
4
statute in Section 210 of the English Companies Act of 1948.3
Prior to enactment of New Jersey Statutes Annotated section
14A:12-7(8) in 1974, four other states, California, Connecticut,
South Carolina, and West Virginia, had statutorily authorized the
buy-out as an alternate remedy to dissolution. 35
Under New Jersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7(8) in
its current form,36 any shareholder who is a party to a court proceeding, or the corporation, may move to buy out any other shareholder who is a party. The court is not to grant the motion unless
it determines that to do so will be fair and equitable to "all parties
under all of the circumstances."3 7 A party cannot move to be
bought out; that is, to force another party to buy his or her shares.
The motion may be made only to force another party to sell to the
movant 38 In other words, litigation under NewJersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7(8) gives every party, subject to the court's
discretion, a call on the shares of any other party, but not a put.
When a shareholder brings an action under New Jersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7, he or she takes the risk that the
defendant will move to buy the plaintiff's shares. The court will
34 The concept of a forced buy-out is not new to business law. The Uniform Partnership Act, adopted in New Jersey at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:1-38.2.b, provides that
partners who have not caused dissolution wrongfully may continue the business provided they pay to any partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully the value of
his partnership interest less any damages recoverable for his act of wrongful dissolution. For an application of this principle, see the description of the Chancery Division
judgment in Stark v. Reingvl Stark v. Reingold, 18 N.J. 251, 258, 113 A.2d 679, 682-83
(1955). The supreme court reversed and directed dissolution of the partnership because it found the other partner had also engaged in serious misconduct. Id. at 263,
113 A.2d at 685.
In In re Astey, what appears to be two equal groups of shareholders had agreed to
submit their disputes to arbitration. In reAstey, 189 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct. 1959). The
arbitrators awarded one group the option to buy out the other. Id. If that option was
not exercised within a fixed time, the other group then had the option to buy out the
first group at the same price. Id. If neither side exercised either option, the arbitrators ruled that the first group would then be obligated to buy out the second group at
the fixed price. Id. The court affirmed the arbitrators' award saying that under the
arbitration rules, the arbitrators were authorized to grant relief which they deemed
just and equitable even though it might not be proper if the controversy were before
the court. Id.
35 See The Commission's Comments to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A12-7, in FinalReport of
the CorporationLaw Revision Commission (1972).
36 For a discussion of the statute, see supra note 6.
37 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A.12-7(8).
38 Brenner v. Berkowitz, 261 N.J. Super. 63, 79, 617 A.2d 1225, 1232-33 (App. Div.
1992), certif granted, 133 N.J. 435, 627 A.2d 1141 (1993); Bostock v. High Tech Elevator Indus., 260 N.J. Super. 432, 444, 616 A.2d 1314, 1320-21 (App. Div. 1992).
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welcome a buy-out motion"9 even if the defendant denies the allegations of the complaint. 40 Not only is dissolution a remedy disfavored by the courts, 41 but a buy-out will likely avoid all issues except
valuation.42 If plaintiff prefers to be the buyer rather than the
seller, he or she must be prepared to cross-move.
Defendant may elect not to move to buy out plaintiff. In a
minority oppression case there is always the possibility that the
plaintiff may fail to prove a cause of action, and the court will dismiss the suit.43 Even where the case before the court is one where
the court believes the parties should be "divided," the court may
not order a buy-out unless the litigation has been brought under
NewJersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7, 44 and a predicate,
such as proof of deadlock or minority oppression, 45 is estabIn a true deadlock situation, where the objective facts
lished.4
meet the requirements of New Jersey Statutes Annotated section
14A:12-7(1) (b), it is unlikely that neither party would move to buy
out the other unless both were prepared to face the consequences
39 The majority of shareholders disputes are resolved by a buy-out See the statistical analyses offered in Haynsworth, supra note 3, at 53, and Hetherington & Dooley,
supra note 3, at 33. It is the most likely remedy a court will impose. Haynsworth, supra
note 3, at 92. By moving under NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A.12-7(8), the defendant, in
effect, is saying: "Judge, if the plaintiff doesn't want to be in business with me, I'll buy
him (her) out." In In re Levitt, the court overrode the plaintiff's objection to defendant's buy-out application, noting that the plaintiff had not been active in the daily
operation of the business. In re Levitt, 492 N.Y.S.2d 736 (App. Div. 1987). Consequently, the court proclaimed that the plaintiffs "legitimate goal in this litigation
should be to secure a fair value for his interest in the business, not to feed the fire of
discontent between the parties." Id. at 741.
40 See In re Cristo Bros., Inc., 478 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1985).
41 See supra text at notes 27-33.
42 Practical problems may follow from a buy-out, particularly where the seller has
been involved in the operation of the business. To a greater or lesser degree a court
may be required to become involved in the transfer of ownership or to provide some
guidelines to the parties for an orderly transition. Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317,
1331 (D.S.C. 1987).
43 In cases where there was no deadlock and plaintiff was unable to establish a
claim for oppression, defendant was under no pressure to buy plaintiffs shares, and
in some cases, chose not to do so. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 3, at 34. See
also Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., Inc., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554
(Law Div. 1979), affd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994, (App. Div. 1980), certif.
denied, 85 N.J. 112, 425 A.2d 273 (1980); Bostock v. High Tech Elevator Indus., Inc.,
260 N.J. Super. 432, 616 A.2d 1314 (App. Div. 1992) (finding that plaintiff had not
proven any of the prerequisites for relief under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A-12-7, but, instead, granting relief based on the parties' agreement).
44 Gershaw v. Ther-A-Pedic Sleep Prods., 218 N.J. Super. 350, 527 A.2d 923 (App.
Div. 1987).
45 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1)(a), (b), or (c).
46 Bostock, 260 N.J. Super. at 442-43, 616 A.2d at 1319-20.
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of dissolution.4"
In NewJersey, prior to December 1, 1988, only the defendant
could move to buy out the plaintiff.48 As a result of one of the
amendments to New Jersey Statutes Annotated section 14A.12-7,
effective December 1, 1988,19 a plaintiff can now move to buy out a
defendant. If, promptly after filing for relief under New Jersey
Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7(1), plaintiff moves to buy out
defendant under New Jersey Statutes Annotated section 14A.127(8), should the consideration of the motion by the court be any
different than when the defendant is the moving party?
Consider an overbearing aggressive 50% plaintiff seeking to
force an inoffensive 50% defendant to sell. Should not the plaintiff be required to make some showing that he or she has the better
right to the corporation before the court grants the motion as an
expedient end to the litigation?5"
The statute instructs that before a court may grant a motion, it
must determine "in its discretion that such an order would be fair
and equitable to all parties under all of the circumstances of the
case." 5 1 Of course an aggrieved plaintiff who is the victim of an
overbearing defendant may ask the same question when the defendant files the buy-out motion, but it is more likely that unless
plaintiff can show that a forced buy-out would be inequitable, the
court will view plaintiff as the unhappy and dissatisfied partner who
"wants out," and will welcome defendant's motion.5 2
When two 50-50 shareholders move to buy the other out, they
resemble warring parents in a custody battle. Each shareholder
seeks to own the "corporate child" to the exclusion of the undesired "partner." The court may deny both motions, grant both motions, or grant one motion and deny the other. On what basis is
the court to make the Solomonic judgment as to whom to award
the baby?
If the court chooses to deny both motions, it may either leave
the parties where it found them53 or determine that plaintiff is en47 When both parties wish to continue a business and neither moves to buy out the
other and dissolution is ordered, both can bid when the business is sold. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 3, at 28.
48 See supra note 6.
49 L.1988, c.94, § 69.
50 See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 3, at 34-35.
51 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A.12-7(8) (West Supp. 1992).
52 See Haynsworth, supra note 3, at 34-35.
53 See, e.g., Springborn v. Anita Land Co., 101 N.E.2d 238 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951)
(where the inability or unwillingness of the two shareholders to work in harmony
resulted in all of the corporate assets being lost, the court left the parties where it
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tited to dissolution or other relief.5 4 If the court grants both motions, it might conduct an auction in the courtroom, 55 which would
be an advantage to the party with greater financial resources. 5 6 If
the court denies both motions and orders dissolution, the result
might also be an auction, but one conducted by a receiver at which
third parties would be invited to bid on the corporation as a whole
before it is sold off in pieces.5 v

IV.

NEW JERSEY CASES DISCUSSING THE

BuY-ouT

REMEDY

There are no reported New Jersey decisions dealing with disputes between 50-50 shareholders after 1974, when NewJersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7 was amended to authorize a court
ordered buy-out.5 8 Buy-out, however, was the subject of two recent
appellate division decisions,5 9 rendered by different panels, decided within three weeks of each other, neither of which involved a
deadlocked corporation. In Bostock v. High Tech Elevator Industries,
Inc.,' ° although the business and personal relationship between a
45% shareholder and a 55% shareholder had deteriorated, the
trial court found that neither had acted in an oppressive fashion.6 1
Nonetheless, the trial court ordered a buy-out. The trial court
found them, granted no equitable relief, and dismissed the claims of both shareholders). See also Haynsworth, supra note 3, at 75-78.
54 See supra text accompanying note 11.
55 See Dear Publications & Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 656, 657 (3d Cir.
1960), which describes a competitive bidding arrangement voluntarily arranged by
the parties after the court had ordered dissolution in Post-Standard Co. v. Evening
Journal Ass'n, 15 NJ. Super. 58, 83 A.2d 38 (Ch. Div. 1951).
56 If both motions are granted, the only real issue is which party will be the higher
bidder and thus able to continue the business. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 3,
at 29.
57 See Haynsworth, supra note 3, at 55. See also In re TJ. Ronan Paint Corp., 469
N.Y.S.2d 931, 937 (App. Div. 1984). In Sternberg v. Osman, the court directed that, if
the parties could not agree on a buy-out plan or the sale of the business to a third
party as a whole within a reasonable period of time, there would be a public sale of
the corporation's assets. Sternberg v. Osman, 582 N.Y.S.2d 208 (App. Div. 1992).
58 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(8) (West Supp. 1992). 68th St. Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella
involved two equal shareholders, but buy-out was not an issue. 68th St. Apts., Inc. v.
Lauricella, 142 NJ. Super. 546, 362 A.2d 78 (Law Div. 1976), aft'd, 150 NJ. Super. 47,
374 A.2d 1222 (App. Div. 1977). 68th St. concerned claims by each party against the
other to recover his individual loss as a shareholder, and derivatively, the loss sustained by the corporation, arising as a result of an earlier proceeding in which a receiver had been appointed to wind up the deadlocked corporation's affairs. Id. at
549-54, 362 A.2d at 80-83.
59 Brenner v. Berkowitz, 261 N.J. Super. 63, 617 A.2d 1225 (App. Div. 1992), certif
denied, 133 N.J. 435, 627 A.2d 1141 (1993); Bostock v. High Tech Elevator Indus., Inc.,
260 N.J. Super. 432, 616 A.2d 1314 (App. Div. 1992).
60 260 N.J. Super. 432, 616 A.2d 1314 (App. Div. 1992).
61 Id. at 438, 616 A.2d at 1317.
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based its order on both New Jersey Statutes Annotated section
14A:12-7 and a shareholders agreement between the parties that
provided for a buy-out. The Appellate Division ruled that the court
below was without authority to order a buy-out under New Jersey
Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7 without a showing of oppression or any other predicate under New Jersey Statutes Annotated
section 14A:12-7(1). 6 2 The order for a buy-out predicated upon
the shareholders' agreement was, however, affirmed.6'
Brenner v. Berkowitz involved a plaintiff holding 40% of the
stock in a corporation and husband and wife defendants (the wife
being plaintiff's sister) holding 60%. In Brenner, the defendant
husband ran the business and the plaintiff was apparently not active in the business.6 5 The trial court found that defendants had
committed acts which were fraudulent, illegal and oppressive,6 6 but
ordered only moderate relief.6 7
In her amended complaint, plaintiff had sought alternate relief in the form of an order permitting her to purchase defendants'
stock, or directing the corporation or defendants to purchase her
stock, or dissolution.' Because one litigant cannot force another
to buy her shares,6 9 and because defendants did not move to force
plaintiff to sell, the trial court said it was powerless to order defendants to buy out the plaintiff.7 °
The appellate division expressed its clear preference for a buyout of either party by the other as the most appropriate remedy.
Although it agreed with the trial court that under NewJersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7(8), "the motion must be made by
a party to the litigation to buy the shares of another party to the
litigation,""i it apparently found enough in the record to authorize
the trial court to order a buy-out in spite of the absence of a formal
motion.
Id. at 44246, 616 A.2d at 1319-22.
Id. at 440-41, 446, 616 A.2d at 1318-19, 1321-22. The court found that pursuant
to the shareholders' agreement, the corporation had exercised its option to purchase
plaintiff's shares and could not subsequently renege on its commitment. Id. at 446-47,
616 A.2d at 1321-22.
64 261 NJ. Super. 63, 617 A.2d 1225 (App. Div. 1992).
65 Id. at 66, 617 A.2d at 1226.
66 Id. at 67, 617 A.2d at 1226-27.
67 Id. The trial court ordered that plaintiff be reinstated as a member of the corporation's board of directors, and enjoined defendants from engaging in further misconduct. Id.
62
63

68 Id.

69 See supra text accompanying note 38.
70 261 N.J. Super. at 79, 617 A.2d at 1232-33.
71 Id.
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The appellate division first relied on a pre-trial settlement conference at which defendants had made the commitment that if the
court found a basis for affording plaintiff relief under the statute,
defendants would file a motion to buy out plaintiff.72 The appellate court also ruled that the trial court could have ordered dissolution and then stayed its order to permit the defendants the
opportunity to move to buy out the plaintiff.7 - Third, it suggested
that plaintiff, who had asked in her complaint for an order to buy
out defendants, could have been directed to file a motion to that
effect.

74

One statement of the Brenner court, however, is unusual and
somewhat unclear:
In view of our holding that plaintiff established more than one
of the grounds for relief specified in [New Jersey Statutes Annotated section] 14A.12-7(1) (c), and the fact that plaintiff wanted
to sell her shares or to buy the majority's shares and the defendants do not wish to have the corporation dissolved, the judge
could have directed defendants to file a motion pursuant to [New
Jersey Statutes Annotated section] 14A:12-7(8) seeking to
purchase plaintiffs
shares to avoid possible dissolution of the
75
corporation.
This sentence can be interpreted in at least three ways. First, it
may be argued that because defendants had agreed at a pre-trial settlement conference to move to buy out plaintiff, the court could have
ordered defendants to do what they had agreed to do. That, however,
had already been said.
Next, it may be assumed that something in the record formed the
basis for the court's statement that defendants did not want the corporation to be dissolved. If so, the quoted sentence could be viewed
merely as a signal to the trial court that it should have prompted defendant's counsel to file a buy-out motion. In McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Sons, Inc.,76 where minority oppression was found, the court
gave the majority three choices: liquidate, partition and reorganization, or buy out plaintiff.
A third interpretation is that the court is saying that even though
Id. at 80, 617 A.2d at 1233.
Id. (citing Hughes v. Sego Int'l. Ltd., 192 N.J. Super. 60, 65, 469 A.2d 74, 77
(App. Div. 1983)).
74 261 N.J. Super. at 80, 617 A.2d at 1233. Even though the complaint requested
that plaintiff be permitted to buy out defendant, it is not surprising that plaintiff, a
40% inactive shareholder, did not move to buy out defendants' 60%.
75 Id. at 80-81, 617 A.2d at 1233-34 (emphasis added).
76 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. CL App. 1986). See also In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473
N.E.2d 1172, 1180.81 (N.Y. 1984).
72

73
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the statute says that a buy-out requires a motion by a party, a court,
nonetheless, has the inherent authority to order a party to make the
motion. This would break new ground in shareholder dispute cases
in New Jersey. Although Gershaw" holds that a buy-out cannot be ordered when a case is not brought under New Jersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7, and Bostock7 s instructs that deadlock or
minority oppression must be shown as a prerequisite to a court ordered buy-out under New Jersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:127(8), Brenner 9 can be read to hold that when a case is brought under
New Jersey Statutes Annotated section 14A.12-7 and minority oppression (or deadlock) has been proved, a court, by directing a party to
make the prerequisite motion, can order a buy-out despite the fact
that neither party voluntarily sought that remedy.
On one hand, this is a strained reading because New Jersey Statutes Annotated section 14A:12-7, unlike the buy-out provisions in statutes in some other jurisdictions," ° expressly envisions a motion by a
party, not by the court sua sponte. Each party may prefer to suffer
dissolution of the corporation rather than be compelled individually
to increase his or her investment in the enterprise. On the other
hand, cases in several other jurisdictions have held that courts, absent
express statutory authority, do have inherent equitable power to force
a buy-out when neither party seeks that form of relief."1
77 Gershaw v. Ther-A-Pedic Sleep Prods., 218 N.J. Super. 350, 527 A.2d 923 (App.
Div. 1987).
78 Bostock v. High Tech Elevator Indus., Inc., 260 N.J. Super. 432, 616 A.2d 1314
(App. Div. 1992).
79 Brenner v. Berkowitz, 261 N.J. Super. 63, 617 A.2d 1225 (App. Div. 1992), certif
denied, 133 N.J. 435, 627 A.2d 1141 (1993).
80 See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 564 (N.C. 1983) (discussing N.C.
GEN. STAT § 55-125.1(a) (4)); Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1319 (D.S.C. 1987)
(discussing S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-155(a)(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
81 New York law appears to authorize a court to order a buy-out even when no
application for a buy-out has been made. See In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Ctr.,
487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (App. Div. 1985). In Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, the court
referred to its inherent power to order a buy-out as an equitable remedy. Alaska
Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980). The court based its ruling on
Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387 (Or. 1973), which lists buy-out
as one of the alternative remedies in shareholder dispute cases.
In Maddox v. Norman, the court, as to its inherent power to order a buy-out, said:
"Plaintiff has not cited, nor does our independent research disclose, any authority to
the contrary. Indeed, the cases cited do not seriously question that courts have such
power, only whether its exercise is appropriate in the particular case." Maddox v.
Norman, 669 P.2d 230, 238 (Mont. 1983). See also Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375,
379-80 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388-89 (N.D. 1987);
Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 (Alaska 1985); Sauer v. Moffit, 363 N.W.2d 269
(Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 564 P.2d 277 (Or. 1977).
In Orchard v. Covelli, the court acknowledged that there was no express Penn-
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In a case brought under New Jersey Statutes Annotated section
14A:12-7, does the trial court have the authority to direct a buy-out
where neither party has voluntarily applied for that relief? The cases
to date do not provide a clear answer. Walensky v. Jonathan Royce
Int'l.,12 decided after Brenner", which affirmed an award of damages

and other compensatory relief, also emphasizes equity's authority and
flexibility to fashion an appropriate remedy in "oppressed" minority
shareholder cases. The Brenner opinion on this issue is confusing.
The court remanded the case to the chancery division "to entertain a
motion from either party for a buy-out,"84 expressing its clear prefernot to orence for that remedy by adding: "it will indeed be difficult
85
der a buy-out given the compelling record in this case."
Whether or not the court may direct one party to move to buy out
another, the clear lesson of both Bostock and Brenner is that where
there is dissension between shareholders in a close corporation, the
court will strive to find a basis on which a buy-out can be ordered to
separate the parties.
V.

THE CHOICE BETWEEN EQUAL SHAREHOLDERS

If both 50% shareholders move to buy out the other, what
should the court consider in making its choice as to which party
goes home with the business and which must accept fair value for
his or her half? Should the court hold a hearing to determine
which of the two is less at fault and which is more to blame for the
existence of the dissension?8 6 Should the court seek to find who
cast the first stone? Will the trial resemble a matrimonial proceedsylvania statutory authority for it to order defendant, over defendant's objection, to
buy out plaintiff, but did so nevertheless because it found dissolution unnecessary and
not in the best interests of the shareholders, and also because a buy-out would be a
fair method of compensating plaintiff. Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D.
Pa. 1984), affd, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986). But see Giannotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d

725 (Va. 1990).
82 264 N.J. Super. 276, 624 A.2d 613 (App. Div. 1993).
83 261 N.J. Super. 63, 617 A.2d 1225 (App. Div. 1992).
84 Id. at 81.
85 Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court has granted a petition for certification in

Brenner, 133 N.J. 435, 627 A.2d 1141. The parties, apparently, have agreed that if the
supreme court rules that plaintiff is entitled to relief under N.J. STAT. ANN. section
14A.12-7, defendants will move to buy out plaintiff. 135 N.J. L.J. 338 (Sept. 20, 1993).
86 In Burlson v. Hayutin, a fifty-fifty shareholder case in which a receiver was appointed, the court compared plaintiff's innocence with defendant's wrongful conduct. Burleson v. Hayutin, 273 P.2d 124 (Colo. 1954). In Hendley v. Lee, the court
declared: "Under generally established equitable principles, fault is a factor to be
considered by a court in fashioning equitable relief under the [deadlock] statute."
Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1323 (D.S.C. 1987). See also Orchard v. Covelli,
590 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aftd, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986).
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ing in the New Jersey Superior Court, Family Part, with incident
after incident of intra corporate bickering being aired?8 7 Will the
demeanor and attitude of the respective litigants become a crucial
factor?
One factor a court might consider is which of the two shareholders will be better able to continue the operation of the business without the other. One author poses a hypothetical
highlighting the dilemma between an efficient solution and an equitable one.8 8 The hypothetical assumes that one of two equal
shareholders is a superior but dishonest business person, and the
other is merely an average business person, who is fair in his or her
dealings. It is probably more efficient to compel the average business person to sell to the superior manager who will be able to
maximize the value of the corporation, yet this result is not equitably appealing.
Another factor which might be considered is the role taken by
each of the parties within the corporate structure. If, for example,
one shareholder is active in the business and the other is not, the
former may be the more appropriate buyer. If one has the loyalty
of the employees, customers, or suppliers, perhaps he or she
should be the buyer.
There are few reported decisions to guide court and counsel
as to how to make the choice between equal shareholders. In Van
Kirk v. Young,"9 the court had to resort to dissolution because
under the terms of the governing West Virginia statute neither
party in a 50-50 corporation could force the sale of the shares from
the other party. It appears that neither the parties nor the court
addressed the issue of whether the court had inherent power, beyond that authorized by statute, to order a buy-out.
87 Compare, for example, Bostock v. High Tech Elevator Indus., Inc., where during
the rapidly deteriorating personal relationship between the two shareholders, one insulted the other's wife, and as a result, was suspended from employment. Bostock v.
High Tech Elevator Indus., Inc., 260 N.J. Super. 432, 437, 616 A.2d 1314 (App. Div.
1992). In In re T.J. Ronan Paint Corp., where dissolution rather than buy-out was the
remedy, the court asserted:
At this stage, where dissolution is sought, the underlying reason for the
dissension is of no moment; nor is it at all relevant to attempt to ascribe
fault to either party. Rather, the critical consideration is the fact that
dissension exists and has resulted in a deadlock precluding the successful and profitable conduct of the corporation's affairs.
In re T.J. Ronan Paint Corp., 469 N.Y.S.2d 931 (App. Div. 1983).
88 Steven C. Bahls, Resolving ShareholderDissension: Selection of the AppropriateEquitable Remedy, 15J. Cou. L. 285, 319 (1990).
89 375 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1988).
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Schaub v. Kortgard9 ° is illustrative of the two person corporation which turns out to be a poor marriage. Soon after the start of
a business, the parties in Schaub were not on speaking terms with
each other. Plaintiff began a court action and both shareholders
moved to buy out the other. The court chose Kortgard because it
appeared that Schaub had earlier accepted a buy-out offer from
Kortgard although no price and terms had been agreed upon.
Several factors are addressed in Hendley v. Lee,9 in which the
court described what it considered in deciding which of two equal
shareholders should be the buyer. The corporation was a profitable and exceptionally well run service business.9 2 The evidence
painted a positive picture of both parties. The background, experience, know-how, reputation and contacts of one of the plaintiffs
were instrumental in the initial success of the corporation. Defendant's managerial abilities were highly rated, and it was acknowledged that he had done an excellentjob as the corporation's
chief executive officer.9" Each side sought to blame the other for
the dispute which had arisen between them.94 The court found
that both sides had contributed equally to the disharmony which
led to the lawsuit.95
Plaintiffs (holding 50%) originally sued for dissolution or to6
9
force the defendant (holding 50%) to sell his shares to them.
Defendant agreed that the corporation was hopelessly deadlocked,
and indicated his desire to purchase plaintiffs' shares.
During the litigation both sides reversed their positions. Plaintiffs sought to have defendant buy them out; defendant sought to
force the plaintiffs to purchase his stock.9 7 The court rejected
plaintiffs' proposed division of the corporation because it would
result in the court being called upon to decide numerous collateral
issues such as use of the corporation's name, questions relating to
creditors, and assignability of contracts.9" The court also rejected
90 372 N.W.2d 427 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).

91 676 F. Supp. 1317 (D.S.C. 1987).
92 Id. at 1322.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1323.
95 Id.
96 The South Carolina statute empowers the court to order purchase of the shares
of any shareholder either by the corporation or the other shareholders. Id. at 1319.
The court recognized that neither party actually desired dissolution, and that asking
for it was merely a jurisdictional prerequisite to the court's granting other relief. Id.
at 1324.
97 Id. at 1319.
98 Id. at 1324.
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dissolution as a drastic and unnecessary remedy,99 and said its only
remaining alternative was to order a buy-out of one side by the
other.1 00
The court ordered that plaintiffs buy out defendant, and gave
the following as reasons for its order:
1. The relative financial positions of the parties differed.
One could easily afford the purchase; the other could not.
2. The defendant had a restrictive covenant with the corporation which the court expanded to protect plaintiffs'
greater investment.
3. The ability of the plaintiffs to operate the corporation,
coupled with the fact that defendant, as a capable manager, would be able to adapt to a different vocation.
4. The defendant would suffer less tax consequences than
plaintiffs.
5. Because plaintiffs were operating a related company, confusion between the companies would be reduced.
6. A purchase by plaintiffs would more likely avoid future disputes between the two individuals.10 '
CONCLUSION

In a general partnership, absent anything to the contrary in
the partnership agreement, any partner may dissolve the partnership. The other partner or partners are then faced with the choice
of either winding up the business (liquidation and termination) or
buying out the interest of the partner who has caused the
dissolution.
When business people seek the protection and attributes of
doing business in a corporate form, they necessarily accept (unless
the certificate of incorporation, by-laws, or a shareholders' agreement provides to the contrary) the norms of corporate democracy.
In a corporation, unlike a partnership, if a minority shareholder
disagrees with the majority or cannot get along with his or her
"partner" or "partners," he or she is not able to "pull the plug" on
the enterprise and force a buy-out absent some form of oppression
or wrongdoing by the majority.
The machinery of corporate democracy does not function,
however, when there are two equal opposing shareholders. Relief
99 Id.
100

Id. at 1325.

101 Id. at 1326-27.
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must be afforded either in the traditional form of dissolution or
the more difficult choice of forcing one shareholder to sell out to
the other for a fair price. When the more frustrated shareholder
seeks relief from the court, he or she must recognize the risk that
even if one succeeds in breaking up the business marriage, the divorce may take an undesirable form.

